Presidential Change in France, Nicholas Sarkozy
Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program:Has the Time-Line Changed?
By Ephraim Asculai
Friday, May 18,
The facts concerning the status of Iran's nuclear project are quite clear. Their implications are unequivocal. Yet there are those in the corridors of power that would lead us to believe that business is still as usual and that much can yet be done to reverse the situation. The following will review the facts, discuss their implications and evaluate the chances of dealing with the precarious situation at the present stage of developments.
The media have been a reliable source of information, in recent years on the situation of Iran's nuclear project. On May 14, David E. Sanger reported in the New York Times that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had carried out a short-notice inspection of Natanz, the site of Iran's industrial-scale uranium enrichment program and that the inspectors found that "Iranian engineers were already using roughly 1,300 centrifuges and were producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors." He also reported that there were estimates that Iran could have 3000 centrifuges operating by June 2007.
It is projected that 3000 operating centrifuges can produce in a year a sufficient quantity of high-enriched uranium (HEU) for one nuclear explosive device. At this point, the Iranian centrifuges are only producing reactor-grade, or low-enriched uranium (LEU). However, if Iran should break all the rules and decide to go for military-grade HEU, it could accomplish this within a few months, with very little technical changes to its operating system.
Given the current realities, what would the timelines be? Some analysts continue to argue that there are still many obstacles that Iran has to overcome before it can acquire a consistent production capacity. In addition, there is also the point of view that it would be wiser for Iran to accumulate a large hoard of LEU and then convert it all to HEU in one fell swoop. This is technically possible, but it would be highly imprudent to base on these assumptions. If this were a purely academic question, speculations of this sort might be justified. In reality, the consequences of guessing wrong are too momentous to sustain this approach. Instead, it is the worst-case scenario that has to govern any decision-making. And the worst-case estimate, according to the above, is that Iran could have a sufficient quantity of HEU for a nuclear weapons as early as 2008 or 2009.
Iran does not need a full industrial-scale operation to achieve a nuclear capability and to suggest otherwise is highly misleading. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been doing. On May 16, The Telegraph reported that the Director-General, Dr. ElBaradei, said that "the West's goal of halting the enrichment programme had been 'overtaken by events'. Iran had probably mastered this process and 'the focus now should be to stop them from going to industrial scale production'." Given the facts in the previous paragraph, this is precisely the wrong approach to take. Iran does not need an industrial-scale operation to go nuclear. All that would do is to speed-up the current rate of production, enabling Iran to achieve a considerable nuclear arsenal in an even shorter time.
Another fallacy that the IAEA has been promoting is that it is capable of verifying that Iran's program is intended for "peaceful purposes" only. This assertion cannot be sustained on either methodological or technical grounds. For example, Iran can certainly proceed to produce enough LEU and then break the rules. There is no way that the IAEA can verify intentions, especially not with its present very limited inspection rights in Iran. On the other hand, the IAEA did find some evidence of the military ambitions of Iran and included this in its reports to its Board of Governors and to the UN Security Council. Even then, however, the IAEA did not sound any alarm bells.
On a parallel plane, almost detached from the technical facts, the Security Council has been biding its time in taking action to rectify the situation by forcing Iran to accept suspension of its uranium enrichment program. Security Council action was delayed for a long time because the IAEA refrained from referring the issue to the Council for years after it should have. And it then took the Council many months to agree on an action resolution, mandating sanctions on Iran, should the latter not reverse its course. At that point, the sanctions were too little and perhaps already too late. Nor did a second resolution rectify the situation. While there were optimistic estimates that the sanctions were working, this point of view was not supported by Iranian deeds, and enrichment goes on. The plain fact of the matter is that unless Iran incurs serious costs, it will not abandon its nuclear ambitions; for the time being, these are pursued without pause. Moreover, as time goes by and Iran progresses, it will have less and less reason to abandon its ambitions, and more reasons to intensify its efforts and shorten its timetables.
In order to take really painful sanctions against Iran, the Security Council must be convinced that the situation warrants this. Russia and China are still adamantly opposed to very strong sanctions. Even the European Union is not totally convinced that strong action must be taken since it estimates that diplomatic negotiations could still win the day. There are also states that repeat the mantra about Iran's "inalienable right" to enrich uranium. This right is preserved only to the extent that Iran obeys all the rules and fulfills all its obligations. Iran clearly did not do so and was indicted by the IAEA for this. If the Security Council will not take the necessary strong action against Iran, the burden to stop Iran will fall on others. And as the latest report implies, time is running short.
Thus far, a major obstacle in the path to effective action has been the reluctance of the IAEA to issue official estimates based on facts and not surmises and to refrain from allowing political considerations to distort its conclusions. In other words, it is high time for the IAEA to wake up and sound the alarm.
INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia