Politics compromised the protection of US diplomats in Benghazi

I was incredulous when I heard of the September 11th assassinations of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Diplomatic Security Officers Glen Doherty, and Tyrone Woods, and Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith. What was a diplomat of Steven’s position doing in Benghazi, separated from the relative security of the Tripoli embassy, and why was he left vulnerable along with his brave yet minimal protection detail? It took three weeks to develop, but the answer is trickling out: For political considerations, the US State Department ignored and denied requests for reasonable and necessary security for their most important personnel in Libya.

As the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee is revealing, the basis for the security denials lies in the State Department’s political objective of normalization of operations in Libya, which is a political euphemism for the softening of the US security profile. In Libya, the most immediate symbols of American presence and influence are the security forces and protective entourages which protect diplomatic structures and personnel. Reducing the number of armed Americans, the American security footprint, in favor of local security forces, is a visible means of achieving normalization. It is becoming clear from the Committee transcripts and media reports that the State Department pursued this softer security policy in Libya with tragic consequences to American diplomatic personnel.

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What was the Obama administration to gain politically by softening the US security profile? This normalization strategy was the logical progression of the Obama administration’s policy objectives in Libya of building an international coalition to stop the massacre in Libya, and supporting the Libyan people as they overthrew the regime of Moammar Qadhafi. President Obama would gain politically if he were viewed as peacemaker rather than occupier, and if it were perceived that there was minimal American involvement in Libya. This strategy required a reduction in the number of armed Americans and a minimization of all security and terror incidents to portray a successful foreign policy outcome. The temporary assignment of a US Ambassador to the Benghazi post with a low security profile would present the Obama administration’s Libyan foreign policy as open and engaging of the people, with a non-confrontational security posture. As reported by Reuters, the Benghazi diplomatic security detail would be augmented by a local militia, the “17th of February Martyrs Brigade”, who were made up of local men who had been merchants and shopkeepers before the war. The militia members were paid approximately thirty US dollars a day by the State Department, but hadn’t been paid in several months at the time of the attack. The decision to have locals be the face of security in Benghazi, reduced the numbers, and therefore the visibility of the American security footprint. According to ABC News,

Eric Nordstrom, the former Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Libya, told congressional investigators looking into the murder of four Americans in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11, that the State Department was eager for the American diplomatic presence in Libya to reduce its American security footprint and to rely more on locals, sources tell ABC News. A senior State Department official denies the charge. In an email from Nordstrom from earlier this month obtained by ABC News, the former Regional Security Officer referred to a list of 230 security incidents in Libya that took place between June 2011 and July 2012, writing that “(t)hese incidents paint a clear picture that the environment in Libya was fragile at best and could degrade quickly. Certainly, not an environment where post should be directed to ‘normalize’ operations and reduce security resources in accordance with an artificial time table.

The congressional testimony thus far reveals that the State Department disregarded the dynamic security situation in Benghazi as well as the Regional Security Office’s requests for more protection. The Benghazi post had been bombed twice, in April and June of 2012. The security situation in Libya had been well documented by the Regional Security Office in Tripoli. In fact, Mr. Nordstrom had requested additional security from the State Department for the Benghazi consulate at least twice, in March and July of 2012, and the Ambassador himself had expressed concern about the safety of the staff in the consulate.  Nordstrom had requested in diplomatic cables a steady deployment of five temporary duty Diplomatic Security Officers and thirteen regular security personnel. At the time of the Benghazi attack there were only three Diplomatic Security Officers assigned to the post. There was also a small “quick response team” of American security personnel stationed less than a mile away in an annex. In his testimony, Mr. Nordstrom stated that in two phone calls to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charlene Lamb that Lamb told him “not to request extensions of Site Security Teams” for what Nordstrom described Lamb citing as “political reasons.” Ms. Lamb also testified at the hearing and admitted that after considering the conditions on the ground she did not believe Benghazi warranted more than the three DSO’s that were assigned. According to the congressional transcript she stated, “When the cable came in where RSO Nordstrom laid out all his staffing requirements and needs, I asked him to work out all the details and line up exactly how many security personnel did he need,” she said. “I said that personally, I would not support it.” In further questioning, Ms. Lamb denied that the security staffing levels were limited by budget. The security situation in Libya had been widely reported as unstable and volatile, yet an American Ambassador, Foreign Service Officer, and staff had been assigned to a residential compound with minimal fortification and diplomatic security. If our government has one responsibility it is for the protection of its people on US soil and in its embassies and consulates abroad. Embassies and consulates are the ultimate expression of US foreign policy (and thus influence) and securing them is the ultimate expression of American competence. The 1979 hostage crisis in Tehran proved too challenging for the Carter administration and it paid the ultimate political price. If one believes the US embassy takeover in Iran to be the beginning of the modern terror threat to the US, then the lower-profile security posture of that period can be understood in that context. However, in the ensuing 33 years, hundreds of terror attacks have demonstrated that embassies and consulates in conflict zones are especially vulnerable and require significant protection.  It is disgraceful that the US State Department ignored and denied requests for increased consulate protection in Libya. Reducing the US security profile for election year political motives compromised the protection of American diplomats in Benghazi. This tragedy should be a warning to future administrations about sacrificing American lives for political gain. Jeffrey Haire is a Law Enforcement professional from Los Angeles, California. He earned his undergraduate degree in Criminal Justice Administration from San Diego State University, and a Master’s degree in Clinical Psychology from Pepperdine University in Malibu, California.